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The importance of food standards in global agricultural trade has increased strongly, 
but the effects are uncertain. Several studies argue that  these standards imposed by 
high-income countries diminish the export opportunities for developing countries and 
concentrate the benefits of trade with processing and retailing companies and large 
farms, thereby casting doubt on the development impact of international agricultural 
trade.  Other argue that the standards can be catalysts for growth.  In this paper we 
critically review the arguments and empirical evidence on the link between increasing 
food standards, developing country exports and welfare in those countries.  We 
conclude that the evidence is often weaker as claimed.  We also provide new insights 
from two recent survey-based empirical studies. We conclude that standards can be a 
catalyst for trade, growth and poverty reduction in developing countries.  
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Introduction   
Over the past 50 years, progress has been made in lowering the barriers to 
trade through a removal o f quotas, a reduction in tariffs and preferential trade 
agreements. This has benefited developing country export performance. Agricultural 
exports from developing countries increased from $ 92 billion in 1980 to $ 169 billion 
in 2000 (Aksoy, 2005). Participation in international trade is generally recognized to 
favor economic  growth and especially agricultural exports would  promote 
development in low-income countries due to the link with the rural economy.  
  However, it is argued that the gains from trade liberalization are offset by 
increasing food standards that  are mainly imposed by high-income countries and 
increasingly dominate the world’s food trading system (Augier et al., 2005; Brenton 
and Manchin, 2002). These standards are argued to act as new barriers to developing 
country exports. Moreover, others argue that high standards concentrate the benefits 
of trade with processing and retailing companies and large farms, thereby casting 
doubt on  the development impact of increased agricultural exports from developing 
countries. Standards would lead to an unequal distribution of the gains from trade and 
result in the marginalization of poorer farmers and small agri-food businesses.     
  The aim of this paper is to review the arguments and empirical evidence on the 
link between increasing food standards, developing country exports and  welfare in 
those countries; and provide new insights from two original case-studies. The main 
conclusion resulting from this study  is twofold.  First, empirical evidence indicates 
that there are important net benefits for developing countries  of investing in food 
quality and safety capacity to address increasing standards. In the short run, the cost 
of non -compliance with standards exceeds by far the cost of compliance. In the long   3 
run, the costs are outweighed by the benefits of compliance. Second, the empirical 
evidence generally does not support the view of small farmers being marginalized as a 
result of increasing food standards.  On the contrary, case-study evidence confirms 
that high-standards agricultural trade can  have important positive effects on  the well-
being of small farmers in developing countries. In summary, standards can serve as a 
catalyst for realizing pro-poor export-led growth in developing countries.   
  The paper is structured as follows. In a next section we briefly describe the 
increased importance of food standards  in world agricultural trade and the factors 
contributing to explaining this. In section three we discuss how standards can act as 
barriers and/or catalyst to developing country exports. The main focus of the paper is 
on the distributional consequences of standards and the welfare implications of high-
standards agricultural trade; which is subject to section four.  In section five we 
present the results of two original case-studies and discuss the insights this brings. In 
section six we present the final conclusions and implications from our study.  
 
 
Increasing food standards 
  Since the past two decades the importance of food standards in agricultural 
trade is increasing sharply. Food standards are increasing not only in quantity but also 
in complexity. We first discuss the reason behind this increase and then the growing 
complexity of food standards.  
  
Factors behind the increasing importance of food standards  
Food standards have emerged and proliferated in rich countries and are 
starting to appear in developing countries, especially in their urban markets. A 
number of factors contribute to explaining the increasing prevalence and importance   4 
of food s tandards in global agricultural trade. First, consumers in high-and middle 
income countries – and increasingly also in urban markets of developing countries – 
have a growing demand for product quality and food safety. This growing demand 
stems from rising  incomes levels, changing dietary habits and increasing health 
awareness. A series of food crises1 during the 1990s in the US and European countries 
and more recently in East Asia have increased consumer awareness for food safety 
risks and have put food safety on top of the agenda in food policy. This has lead to 
public and private action in setting food standards, establishing effective control 
mechanisms, developing certification schemes and validating food labels; and has 
resulted in a complex aggregate o f food standards. In addition, consumers are 
increasingly (made) aware of ethical and environmental aspects related to food and 
agricultural trade, which increases the need for standards related to these aspects and 
results in action from the non -profit sector.   
  Second, increased trade in fresh food products prone to food safety risks has 
increased the need for elaborated food standards that guarantee food quality and 
safety throughout the supply chain. The share of fresh food products – such as fruits 
and vegetables, and fish and seafood products  – in world agricultural trade, and 
especially in developing country exports, has increased sharply over the past two 
decades (Aksoy, 2005). Fresh food products are not only subject to specific quality 
and safety demands by consumers in high-income countries; trade in such products 
also entails higher food safety and quality risks. The increased importance of trade in 
fresh products has put forward differences in norms between countries that stem from 
cultural differences, differences in income levels and difference in food safety risks 
and the perception of these risks. In general, consumers’ expectations for quality and 
                                                   
1 E.g. BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) in the UK, E.coli in hamburgers in the US; dioxine in 
animal feed in Belgium, salmonella outbreak in UK, and avian flu in Asia.   5 
safety are much lower in developing countries than international norms (Wilson and 
Abiola, 2003). T his  divergence in norms across countries  has created a need for 
coordinating international trade in food and agricultural products through standards.  
  Third, the changing structure of the agri-food chain with food distribution 
increasingly organized through large retail chains – in industrial countries2 as well as 
in developing countries3 – has increased the importance of food standards. Large 
retailers such as super- and hypermarkets put much emphasis on freshness, product 
quality and food safety because the risk of selling ‘bad’ food is potentially 
catastrophic to a branded supermarket – much more than to traditional traders in a wet 
market where the rule is caveat emptor
4 (Gulati et al, 2005) 
  Fourth, the presence of foreign investors and subsidiaries of multinational 
companies in the agro-food sector in developing countries has contributed to the 
prevalence of food standards. FDI in food processing, exporting and retailing in 
developing countries is increasing as a result from a liberalized investment climate 
and proactive efforts by developing countries to attract FDI in this sector5. Such FDI 
companies might impose and spread the use of high standards in developing countries 
to serve markets in their home economies, to reduce transaction costs in regional 
distribution and supply chains, or to harmonize production and processing standards 
across subsidiaries of multinational holdings. 
  Fifth, enhanced technical and scientific knowledge has contributed to the 
increasing complexity of food standards. Scientific expertise of food safety risks and 
                                                   
2 The concentration in food retail is particularly high in some EU countries such as France where eight 
retailers account for 90% of food retails.  Also in the US this increased consolidation is apparent with a 
market share of the top 20 retailers that has grown from 37% in 1987 to 59% in 2001.   
3 Particularly in Latin America and Asia large super- and hypermarkets are emerging and gaining 
importance. The share of food retailed through these outlets ranges between 30% and 75% in Latin 
American countries (Reardon and Berdeque, 2002): 
4 Caveat emptor or ‘let the buyer be aware’. 
5 A survey of African investment promotion agencies carried out by UNCTAD (1999) suggests that the 
agri-food sector receives a considerable share of total FDI inflows in those countries.     6 
agricultural health has facilitated (and justified) the accurate setting of food standards 
in correspondence with public health interests. Also new technical possibilities have 
shifted norms and consumer expectations.  
 
Increased complexity of food standards 
The increased  complexity of food standards is apparent in a number of ways. 
First, there are standards at different levels – national, regional and international – and 
a lack of harmonization across these levels and across countries. Even within the EU 
certain standards (e.g. MRL,  maximum contaminations levels) vary largely across 
countries and differ from EU and international standards.  
Second, there is a distinction between mandatory or public and voluntary or 
private standards6. The former are set by national and international legislation while 
the latter emerge from the private sector.  Large  food  processing  and distribution 
companies are increasingly engaging in establishing their own private standards for 
food safety and quality7. The delineation between public and private standards is not 
always clear. For example in the case of EU traceability standards 8  there is a 
mandatory part that applies to agro-food businesses within the EU and a private part 
imposed by various importers who require traceability throughout the chain u p to the 
level of overseas primary producers.  
Third, there are standards in different spheres, focusing on different aspect. 
Often a distinction is made between product standards that s tipulate attributes of the 
                                                   
6 Private standards are sometimes referred to as market-driven standards while public standards are 
called technical (Wilson and Abiola, 2003). We do not use this distinction here as in our view public 
standards go beyond technical regulation while private standards may include technical specifications 
as well.     
7 Henson (2006) describes the evolution of private standards and outlines how and why these private 
standards have come to play an increasingly dominant role.  
8 Traceability in general requires agro-food business to document from/to whom they are 
buying/selling produce such that products can be traced back to their origin in case of food safety risks.    7 
product itself and process standards that relate to the processes of production, 
handling, processing and transportation. These latter standards are becoming 
increasingly important (Farina and Reardon, 2000). In the literature most attention has 
been given to food quality, safety and agricultural health standards. However, also 
other standards are emerging and are likely to increase in importance in the future. 
These include among others ethical standards (e.g. the UK Ethical Trade Initiative 
which is concerned with labor practices) and environmental standards (e.g. Rainbow 
Alliance focusing on sustainable management practices and ecosystems protection), 
which are often the initiative of NGO’s and trade unions.  
Fourth, n ot only the standards itself but also the control and enforcement 
mechanisms  are increasingly  complex. Procedures for conformity assessment and 
monitoring compliance with food standards differ strongly across countries and are 
increasingly arranged by the private sector. For example, Jaffee (2003) notes that, 
despite efforts to harmonize regulations for pesticide residues for FFV imports in the 
EU, there remain wide variations owing to different country approaches to 
surveillance and enforcement. Henson and Mitullah (2004) report wide variations in 
food safety requirements and conformity assessment procedure – border inspection in 
the importing country versus certification of processing facilities in the exporting 
country – in the case of fishery products.  
   
Food standards as barriers and catalysts for export growth  
Food standards are increasingly important for developing countries’ exports. 
Some argue that standards are new  trade  barriers that diminish the export 
opportunities for developing countries and offset the gains from trade liberalization 
(e.g. Augier et al., 2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002). Others claim that compliance   8 
with food standards can be a catalyst for upgrading and modernization of developing 
country’s food supply systems (e.g. Jaffee and Henson, 2005). In this  section we 
briefly review and challenge the arguments of these different views
9.    
 
Discriminatory use of standards  
Food standards have the potential to be used as protectionist tools or as a 
(scientifically-justified) excuse for protectionism by industrial countries. Standards 
can be set higher for imports than for domestically produced goods or standards can 
be designed to protect national industries rather than consumer health. Increased trade 
liberalization creates incentives for countries that see quotas removed and tariffs 
reduced, to indeed (mis)use standards to bar developing country exports and protect 
domestic farmers and agri-food companies (Neff and Malanovski, 1996).  
The empirical  evidence on this is mixed.  Some argue that the protectionist use 
of standards and trade disputes over food quality and safety issues has increased in the 
past decade and is likely to increase in the future. For example Mathews et al. (2003) 
note that several countries effectively discriminate by having zero-tolerance for 
salmonella on imports of poultry products while not attaining and not monitoring this 
standard for domestic supplies. However, Jaffee and Henson (2005) argue that there is 
no systematic evidence on whether or not countries apply higher standards to imports 
than to domestically supplied food products.  
Still, t he WTO has taken action to circumvent such discriminatory use of 
standards with the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and has seen a rise in dispute settlement cases 
                                                   
9 We discuss the impact of standards in general and do not distinguish between in particular between 
public and private standards. Henson (2006) notes that much of the debate on the impact of food 
standards has focussed on public standards and provides arguments on how private standards in 
particular can affect developing countries’ exports.    9 
related to these agreements (Hufbauer et al., 2002). A key message for developing 
countries is to develop expertise for participation in international negotiations and 
capacity to settle international trade disputes.  
 
Cost of compliance  
Apart from the discriminatory use of standards there is another reason why 
standards may act as barriers to trade: the high cost-of-compliance with food 
standards.  This cost is likely to be higher for developing countries because they 
generally lack the institutional, technical and scientific capacity for food quality and 
safety management. Hence adherence to high standards imposed by high-income 
countries might require substantial investment – from the public sector
10 as well as 
from the private sector  – to realize that capacity. In addition, there is  generally a 
divergence between national food quality and safety norms in a particular country and 
international standards. This ‘standards diverge’ increases the cost of compliance and 
is likely to be higher for developing countries. For poor countries, lacking financial 
means, the cost of compliance with standards might be too high and undermine their 
competitive capacity.  
However, some studies have estimated the cost of compliance to food quality 
and safety standards and have demonstrated that these are much lower than generally 
assumed. For example Aloui and Kenny (2005) estimate the cost of compliance with 
SPS measures to be three percent of total costs of export tomato production in 
Morocco.  Cato et al. (2005) have estimated the cost to implement compliance to 
quality and safety standards to be less than less than 3% and the cost to maintain this 
compliance less than 1% of the total  value of shrimp exports from Nicaragua. Still, it 
                                                   
10 Compliance with high food standards might require public investment in infrastructure and 
institutions to improve the administrative, technical and legal capacity for food safety management.    10 
is argued that compliance costs could be substantially reduced if standards would be 
harmonized across countries and internationally  uniform conformity assessment and 
certification producers adopted (Aloui and Kenny, 2005).    
 
Cost of non- compliance  
The cost of compliance might be relatively low compared to export earnings 
but the cost of non-compliance with standards is potentially very high. The inability to 
comply with food standards can lead to  border detentions of produce and trade 
restrictions such as import bans for specific products. For example, in 1997 the EU 
banned fish exports from Kenya on grounds of food safety risks (Henson et al., 2000) 
and from Bangladesh on the basis of incompliance with hygiene norms in processing 
plants (Unnevehr, 2000). The US Food and Drug Administration reported almost 
3,000 border detentions of imported FFV and more than 1,500 detentions of fishery 
products in  the period January  – May 1999. Most of the products originate from 
developing countries and are denied  because of contamination, pesticide residue 
violation and failure to meet labeling requirements (Unnevehr, 2000).    
Such detentions and import bans are extremely costly; in the short run in terms 
of immediate forgone export earnings and in the long run in terms of damaging a 
country’s reputation and eroding its export competitiveness. For example the EU ban 
on fish exports from Kenya decreased export earnings with 37% (Henson et al., 2000) 
and US border detentions of vegetable shipments from Guatemala made this country 
lose $ 35 million annually in the period 1995-1997 (Julian et al., 2000).   
 
Benefits of compliance  
Some developing countries have been successful in complying with increasing 
food standards. Among the success stories are Thai and Kenyan horticulture (World   11 
Bank, 2005;  Jaffee, 2003); Thai and Nicaraguan shrimp (World Bank, 2005); and 
Indian spices (Jaffee, 2005). The case-studies at the end of this paper demonstrate that 
also FFV exports from Senegal and Madagascar can be added to this list.  These 
sectors experienced accelerated export growth precisely during a period of increasing 
standards – as was the case also for Kenyan export horticulture (Jaffee, 2003).    
Instead of acting as barriers, emerging food safety and quality standard might 
provide incentives for developing countries for upgrading their export capacity and 
for gaining access to high value food markets. Jaffee and Henson (2004) note that the 
most successful countries and/or sectors have used high quality and safety standards 
to (re)-position themselves in competitive global markets. In fact, standards provide a 
bridge between producers in developing countries and consumer preferences in high-
income markets and could be used as catalysts for upgrading and modernization of 
developing countries’ food supply systems and improving their competitive capacity. 
If standards can be used as catalysts in such a way, they provide a basis for long term 
export growth. A key element in  attaining these benefits is to be proactive in food 
quality  and safety and facilitate business strategic responses (Jaffee and Henson, 
2004).  
 
Food standards as barriers and catalysts for growth and poverty reduction   
  Understanding the link between standards  on the one hand  and export 
competitiveness and performance of developing countries on the other hand is crucial 
in the design of a broader development agenda. Yet, a more critical  issue for policy-
makers concerned with equitable growth, is to understand the link between standards, 
developing country exports and poverty in those countries. As indicated by the World 
Bank (2005) the cost and structural changes associated with compliance with food 
standards can cause significant redistribution of welfare  across countries,  along   12 
supply chains and in societies. Such redistribution determines the capacity of high-
standards agricultural trade to serve not only as a basis for long term export growth 
and a tool for upgrading and modernizing developing country food supply systems but 
also as an engine of economic growth and poverty reduction. Some studies argue that 
high-standards  trade may do little for the fate of poor farmers and fishermen as they 
are likely to be excluded from high-value supply chains while the rents in the chain 
are extracted by multinational companies and developing country elites (e.g. Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al, 1999). But empirical 
evidence supporting these arguments is limited.   
In analyzing  the distributive  consequences  – a nd ultimately the welfare 
implications – of high-standards agricultural trade in developing countries on should 
distinguish  two  issues. The first  (“exclusion”)  concerns the  participation and 
exclusion of weaker players such as small and medium enterprises and poor farmers. 
The second  (“rent distribution”) concerns the distribution of the gains from high-
standards agricultural trade among the different participating agents within the supply 
chain. Both issues are critically related to how food supply chains have restructured in 
response to increasing food standards. These structural changes include consolidation 
and increased vertical coordination at different levels of the supply chain and their 
effects. In what follows we discuss these structural changes and the implications for 
the participation of smaller enterprises and poorer farmers in high-standards supply 
chains and their share in the benefits thereof. We  briefly review the  (limited) 
empirical evidence available from the literature and present two original case-studies 
which bring important new perspectives into the debate.   
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Food standards and supply chain restructuring: consolidation  
Food standards pose specific challenges to small agro-food businesses, 
exporters and farmers in developing countries to stay into business in export markets. 
These challenges arise from the  – financial and other  – constraints  these small 
enterprises face in complying with food standards.  They experience  difficulties in 
accessing the necessary information on standards, in translating such information into 
specific investment needs, and in making the necessary investments for quality and 
safety upgrading while facing financial, technical and institutional constraints. 
Although, in general, the cost of compliance with standards might be low relative to 
the total export value in a particular sector, this cost might be very high relative to the 
means of small firms and poor farmers (Reardon et al., 1999).  Therefore food 
standards can lead to those weaker players exiting the profitable export market and 
hence to consolidation of the export supply base.  
The literature has presented some evidence of  ongoing  consolidation  of 
agricultural exporting activities  in developing countries. Dolan and Humphrey (2000) 
find that in Kenya and Zimbabwe smaller firms are increasingly squeezed out of fresh 
vegetable trade and that the FFV export sector is dominated by a few large agro-
industrial companies and exporters. Also Jaffee (2003) points to that fact for the case 
of Kenya FFV exports and estimates that 90% of the export  volume is controlled by 
(only) six companies.  
There is also evidence of ongoing consolidation at the level of  primary 
production. This is closely related to increased vertical coordination in the export 
supply chain and is discussed further.     
   14 
 
Food standards and supply chain restructuring: vertical coordination  
   Compliance with increasingly complex and stringent food  standards a nd 
monitoring of this compliance throughout the supply chain requires tighter vertical 
coordination at different nodes in the chain. At the export-import node of the chain; 
importers in high-standards markets, especially the large retail chains, increasingly 
procure from a list of preferred suppliers in order to guarantee quality and safety of 
the produce. Being on this list and attract contract deals with importers becomes 
increasingly crucial for exporters in developing countries to gain and maintain market 
access. This is specifically tough for smaller exporters who are disadvantaged in 
vertically coordinated supply chains because they cannot provide the quantities large 
multinational food distributors demand. This might lead to further consolidation at the 
level of exporting companies. For example  in Kenya, the few  large FFV exporting 
companies who dominate the sector all have contracts with supermarket chains in the 
UK and other European countries (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).   
Upstream the supply chain, vertical coordination between exporters/processors 
and primary producers in developing countries might increase.  Traditional spot 
market trading systems with intermediaries or ‘middlemen’ are generally not effective 
in high-standards export supply chains. In such trading systems, monitoring 
compliance with standards is extremely difficult and expensive in terms of transaction 
costs. Increased vertical coordination upstream the supply chain can occur in  two 
ways. First, agro-exporting firms relying on contract-farming with primary producers 
might apply tighter contract coordination as to guarantee product quality and assure 
process conformity. Such production contracts can include specifications on specific 
product and process attributes in addition to an agreement on the price and quantity to   15 
be delivered. Moreover, contractor firms can intensify farm assistance programs with 
the provision of inputs, credit, loan guarantees and extension services such that 
contracted suppliers can overcome the financial, technical and other constraints they 
face for compliance with food standards. Firms might also involve more closely in 
farm mana gement decision; e.g. by stipulating the technical itinerary to follow or by 
carrying out chemical application on the farmers’ fields. Such highly coordinated 
contracts reduce transaction costs related to enforcing compliance with standards, 
monitoring product quality and assuring safety of food production and processing. In 
addition, contract-farming might ease conformity to traceability standards; which are 
increasingly important for exports to the EU.  
Second,  it is argued that  there is a shift from  smallholder contract-based 
production towards large-scale vertically integrated estate production. This would be 
a more radical change of increased vertical coordination and implies exporters and 
agro-processing companies to start their own primary production on bought or rented 
land.  Such integrated way  of production  increases the scope for standardized 
production and for meeting high standards at low transaction costs. However, such 
large-scale integrated production entails  risks for agro-exporting companies  and 
increases other costs; e.g. supervision costs of labor and the cost of renting or buying 
land.     
Empirical evidence  shows that vertical coordination in developing country 
export supply chains increases with increasing food standards.  Gulati et al. (2005) 
have noted a sharp increase  in animal contract-production in Southeast Asia in 
response to increasing standards. For the FFV export sector in Kenya Jaffee (2003) 
reports intensified extension services and closer governance in supplier-contracts, 
motivated by increased standards.    16 
However, there is mixed evidence on how far-reaching the shift from small-
scale contract-based production to large-scale industrial estate production actually is. 
Jaffee (2003) estimates that the share of smallholder production in total vegetable 
exports  in Kenya  has decreased from 45% in the mid 1980s to 27% in 2002. Dolan 
and Humphrey (2000) state this shift in Kenyan horticulture to be much more 
pronounced with smallholder production decreasing from 75% to 18% over a 
decade
11.  Also Minot and Ngigi (2004) observe a shift towards vertically integrated 
agro-industrial production in the banana sector in Ivory Cost.  However, Unnevher 
(2000) mentions the fruit export sector in Ivory Cost  to be still largely based on 
smallholder contract-production.  
The empirical  findings  highlight that there might be a divergence in how 
supply chains respond to increasing standards and that hence more empirical evidence 
is needed to provide a more general picture. Below we present evidence from  two 
case-studies that illustrate this divergence.  
 
Participation of small farmers  
The general view in the literature is that small farmers, and especially the 
poorest ones,  are  increasingly being squeezed out from high-standards export 
production12. Many authors point to the fact that poor farmers do not benefit from 
agricultural trade because high standards impede their participation in export supply 
chains (e.g. Reardon et al., 2003; Pimbert et al., 2001; Kerallah, 2000; Gibbon, 2003).  
This exclusion of the smallest farmers is argued to happen either  because 
contract-farming is biased towards large farmers or because large-scale vertically 
                                                   
11 For a more detailed discussion on the importance of smallholder contract-faring in the Kenyan FFV 
export sector and an explanation for the varying figures presented in the literature, we refer to Gibbon 
(2003).  
12 Another view is supported by Swinnen (2005) for the case of transition countries where a 
surprisingly large number of small farmers is included in high-value food supply chains.     17 
integrated production crowds out small suppliers.  First, contract-farming might be 
biased to larger farmers because of t he high transaction costs processing and 
exporting firms face in sourcing from a large number of (dispersed) small suppliers 
(Key and Runsten, 1999).  Especially monitoring conformity with standards  might 
involve very high transaction costs. Second, smaller and poorer farmers might need 
more  intensified  farm extension and additional financial assistance in order to meet 
quality and safety standards. The burden this brings to  exporting companies  might 
lead them to choose to contract only larger farmers.  
However, s tandards are themselves instruments for  specifying and 
harmonizing products and processes attributes over suppliers, thereby reducing 
transaction costs in dealing with a large number of suppliers (Reardon et al., 2003). 
Moreover, well-specified contracts include farm extension and assistance programs 
that can alleviate the financial and technical constraints small farmers face in meeting 
increasingly stringent standards. In fact , high-standards contract-farming including 
tight contract-coordination and intensified farm assistance programs could provide a 
basis for constrained small farmers to become involved in high-value export 
production.  In addition, there are a number of reasons why exporting firms might 
prefer to contract with smaller farmers. First, smaller farmers might have substantive 
cost advantages, especially if it concerns labour intensive production with relatively 
small economies of scale, such as FFV production (Swinnen, 2005). Second, contract-
enforcement might be less costly with small suppliers then with large farms (Swinnen, 
2005).  
While several papers in the  literature  argue that the poorest farmers  are 
excluded from high-value contract-farming (e.g. Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon 
and Reardon, 2003; Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Reardon   18 
et al., 1999) there are actually very few studies providing strong empirical evidence 
on this issue. Moreover, to assess the impact of food standards and induced supply 
chain restructuring on overall participation of rural household in high-standards 
supply chains, one needs to look beyond exclusion from contract-farming.  An 
important  – and much overlooked  – argument in the debate on the shift from 
smallholder contract-based production to large-scale integrated estate production is 
that the exclusion of small suppliers, if it happens, is only a partial outcome. One 
needs to take into account the new employment opportunities brought about by 
increased estate production. Rather then decreasing overall participation of small 
farmers, the induced shift to high-standards estate farming may primarily change the 
status of household participation in the supply chain from (contracted) farmers to 
(salaried) farm workers.  
Furthermore, if contract -farming is indeed biased to relatively larger farmers, 
it might well be that a shift from smallholder contract-based production to estate 
production improves the participation of poorer households as farm workers on agro-
industrial estates. This puts a new perspective into the debate on household 
participation in high-standards production on which the empirical evidence  – that 
needs to be based on farm and household-level survey work – is still  lacking.  One of 
the case-studies presented below fills this gap in the empirical literature.  
   
Distribution of the gains 
  Participation of small enterprises and poorer farmers in high-standards export 
production and trade is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an enhanced 
welfare effect of high-standards agricultural trade; these agents also  need to 
effectively benefit from this participation. It has been repeatedly argued in the literate   19 
that the gains from high-standards agricultural trade are captured by foreign investors 
and developing country elites (e.g. Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 
2000; Reardon et al., 1999).  
Contract-farming has been criticized as a tool for agro-industrial firms and 
food multinationals to exploit unequal power relationship vis-à-vis farmers and to 
extract rents from the supply chain to the disadvantage of poor farmers (Warning and 
Key, 2002). Consolidation of the export supply base and vertical coordination in the 
supply chain are said to amplify the bargaining power of large exporting companies 
and displace decision-making authority from the farmers  to the downstream agro-
industrial companies. This would strengthen the capacity of large companies to 
extract rents from the chain.  
However, contracts in general reduce transaction costs and provide a basis for 
constrained farmers to access the credit, inputs, and technology  they need in order to 
upgrade their production processes to meet increasing food standards and share in the 
benefits from high-standards agricultural trade.  Moreover, contract-farming can 
reduce crop price v olatility, lead to more stable incomes and reduce households’ cash 
flow constraints.  
  Recent empirical studies have demonstrated this beneficial effect of contract-
farming for rural household in low-income countries. For example Dries and Swinnen 
(2004) show that small dairy farmers gain in  terms if  productivity  and investment 
from contract-production with large foreign milk processors. Gulati et al. (2005) 
provide similar evidence for the case of smallholder animal production in Southeast 
Asia. In addition, apart from the direct benefits from contract-farming, there might be 
important farm and household spillover effects. This is demonstrated in the case-study 
on vegetable exports from Madagascar below.    20 
The shift form smallholder contract-based production to large-scale industrial 
farming is generally perceived as bad from an equity perspective. This shift would 
marginalize small farmers, change their status from farmers to farm -workers, and 
diminish the gains they receive from agricultural trade. However, this argument seems 
to run  counter to  development economics literature  which  mentions off-farm 
employment opportunities as an important catalyst for rural development and poverty 
reduction due to farm – non-farm linkages.   Humphrey et al. (2004) find  that 
households involved in export horticulture in Kenya, whether as contracted farmer or 
as farm worker on agro-industrial estates, are better-off than those which are not. We 





Case-studies on the welfare implications of high-standards exports  
The following two case-studies  provide illustrative examples of the welfare 
impact of high-standards agricultural trade in two poor Sub-Sahara Africa countries; 
Madagascar and Senegal.  
  
The case of vegetable exports from Madagascar (from Minten et al., 2006) 
In Madagascar – one of the poorest countries in the world – the production of 
vegetables, mainly beans, destined for export to EU supermarkets has grown rapidly 
over the last fifteen years despite the imposition of more stringent public and private 
safety and quality requirements. The number of export-oriented vegetable farmers has 
grown, despite major disadvantages of geography, bad local infrastructure, low rural   21 
education levels, and high compliance and transaction costs. Almost 10,000 
smallholders in the Highlands of Madagascar produce vegetables for supermarkets in 
Europe on extremely small plots of land ranging from 0.01 to 0.05 ha.  
The vast majority of high-standards  vegetable exports from Madagascar go 
through one company, who has regular contracts with five supermarket chains in 
Europe. The firm is obliged to stick to the requirements of these supermarkets through 
private protocols which indicate the required quality of the product (length of the 
beans, colour, etc.),  hygiene instructions in the processing plant but also ethical 
standards (e.g. proscription of child labour) and employment practices. The company 
itself buys vegetables from more than 9,000 small farmers based on contracts. These 
contracted farmers are small farmers with an average farm area of 1 h a, which is 
about the national average farm size in Madagascar. As part of the contract, seeds, 
fertilizer and pesticides are supplied on credit by the firm at the beginning of the 
growing season. The firm has set up an elaborate system of on-farm monitoring using 
a strict hierarchical structure with around 300 permanent extension agents.  The 
majority of contracted farmers (71%)  are visited by these company agents at least 
once a week; a nd many (41%) even several times a week. With this intensive 
monitoring systems the company wants to ensure correct production management, 
avoid ‘side-selling’ and provide technical advice to the farmers. In some cases (34% 
of contracted farmers) the company agents themselves take care of chemical 
applications on the farmers’ field in order to ensure adherence to strict MRL standards 
that apply in EU countries.  
Farmers largely benefit from this high-standards contract-production through a 
combination of effects. First, the contract directly improves farmers’ access to modern 
inputs and credit. For example 57% of contracted farmers mentions not to be able to   22 
find the same quality seeds themselves without the aid of the contractor company. 
Second, the income  gained from contract-farming importantly contributes to 
household income. Household income from high-standard vegetable production on 
contract is on average 87,270 Ariary and constitutes 47% of total monetary household 
income. Third, contracts lead to large productivity spillover effects on other crops 
which further contribute to enhanced income.  One of the benefits of contracting 
farming is that the firm teaches farmers better technologies and management practises 
such as the use of compost. This results in spillover effects on other crops. More than 
90% of contract-farmers have changed their cultivation method for other crops after 
they signed the contract (table 1). As a result rice productivity is 64% higher on plots 
under contract. Fourth, smallholders who participate in contract-farming have higher 
welfare and more income stability. The length of the lean period has reduced with two 
months due to contract-farming (figure 1); which is an important indication of poverty 
reduction.  
The case of vegetables exports from Senegal
13 (from Maertens and Swinnen, 2006) 
Exports of FFV from Senegal increased sharply over the past 15 years and 
play a central role in Senegal’s export diversification strategy. The majority of these 
exports is French beans destined for the EU market and has to satisfy a series of 
stringent public and private food quality and safety standards such as marketing 
standards, SPS measures including maximum residue levels and hygiene rules. 
Throughout the past couple of years EU food standards increased with new and more 
stringent measures, such as traceability requirements, HACCP control mechanism and 
maximum levels of contaminations by heavy metals. Despite these increasing 
                                                   
13 The case-study is based on a unique dataset combining data from existing data sources and 
information form qualitative expert interviews with primary data collected in 2005 from quantitative 
interviews with nine vegetable exporting companies and a survey of 300 households in the main 
horticulture region of the country (for more details see Maertens and Swinnen, 2006).   23 
standards Senegal has been able to successfully establish the label Origin Sénégalaise, 
maintain its competitive position in the international export market and increase 
horticulture export earnings during the past couple of years (figure 2).    
Increasing food standards have induced structural changes in the  vegetable 
export supply chain in Senegal. They put pressure on exporters to make additional 
investments for compliance with standards and only larger companies are able to 
make these investments. From 2000 onwards some of the  smaller exporters have 
dropped out which has resulted in consolidation of the supply base: from 27 vegetable 
exporting companies in 2000 to only 20 exporting firms in 2005. In addition, 
standards have induced increased vertical coordination in the export supply chain. 
First, exporting firms, especially larger firms, are increasingly engaging in tighter 
coordination  with downstream importers and wholesalers in the EU through more 
binding contracts. Second, exporting firms rely on more elaborated production 
contracts with smallholders and tighter coordination within those contracts. Some 
firms go as far in contract-coordination as the complete management of fertilizer and 
pesticide application and daily or weekly inspection of the farmers’ fields. Third, 
larger exporters in  the chain  are increasingly engaging in fully integrated estate 
production instead of relying on contracts with small farmers (table 2).  In fact, the 
seven largest exporters have founded an organization in 1999 with the specific aim to 
comply with traceability standards and become EurepGAP certified and have agreed 
on account of this to seek to source at least 50% of the exported volume from the 
companies own estate production. This recent shift from smallholder contract-farming 
towards integrated estate production has resulted in a decreasing volume of vegetables 
that is sourced from smallholders.    24 
  High-standards exports and the induced  structural changes in the vegetable 
export supply chain in Senegal have major implications for small farmers and rural 
households. First, participation of rural households in export production continues to 
increase but their role is shifting from contract -farmers to estate  farm -workers. 
Overall participation of local households in vegetable export production has increased 
from 10% in 1992 to 40% in 2005 (figure 3). However the nature of household 
participation has changed. During the 1990s households increasingly participated in 
export production through contract-farming while from 2000 onwards household 
participation grew mostly through estate wage employment while contract-farming 
decreased. Second,  not only more but also more poorer households participate in 
export production as farm workers on agro-industrial estates. Contract-farming in 
export vegetable production is biased towards relatively better-off (albeit still small) 
farmers with more land and means to cultivate the land while wage employment in 
vegetable estates undertaken by rather poorer, larger and lower educated households. 
With the shift from  smallholder contract-farming towards integrated estate 
production, induced by increasing food standards, participation in the vegetable 
export supply chain became more equitable. Third, this participation, whether as 
estate farm worker or as contracted farmer,  increases household income by 
respectively 60% and 120% (figure 4). Fourth,  these developments have a major 
impact on rural poverty reduction. It is estimated that poverty is actually 17% lower 
than in the hypothetical case of no vegetable export production.   
 
Conclusions  
Both case-studies show tha t with increasing, complex and stringent standards 
it is possible for poor countries to maintain their competitive capacity in export   25 
markets. Firms’ strategic responses are important in this but these responses might 
diverge across countries, reflecting underlying differences in initial conditions, and 
lead to different supply chain structures. In Madagascar increasing standards have led 
to the elaboration of an intensified smallholder contract system with increased 
coordination, monitoring and extension while in Senegal exporting companies have 
sought to increase vertically integrated production on bought or rented land. As a 
result, high-standards vegetable export production is realized through smallholder 
contract-production in Madagascar while it is increasingly organized around 
integrated estate production in Senegal.  Both strategies have been successful for 
realizing high-standards exports and for assuring small farmers and rural household to 
share in the benefits of these exports. The case-study from Madagascar illustrates that 
given the right incentives poor farmers can successfully participate in and gain from 
high-standards export production.  The results from Senegal demonstrate that rural 
households do share in the benefits of high-standards export production, even if this 
production is realized through integrated estate farming rather then through 
smallholder contract-farming. Moreover, these positive welfare effects emerge even if 
the export sector is becoming increasingly concentrated and dominated by one (as in 
the case of Madagascar) or a few large firms. The benefits rural households receive 
might be direct or indirect (as illustrated by the Madagascar case-study) and can lead 
to improved equity and reduced poverty in rural societies (as illustrated by the 
Senegal case-study). These case-studies are unique in directly analyzing the welfare 
effects of high-standards agricultural trade at the local level and clearly indicate that 
standards can be a catalyst for trade, growth and poverty reduction  in developing 
countries.          26 
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Tables  
 




Are you obliged to produce compost and use it on your plots? 93
Before you first contract with the firm, did you use already compost? 12
Are you now using compost on other plots than those under contract?  87
If the contract would stop, would you continue using compost? 95
Did you change the cultivation method of other crops because of the contract? 93
a. use of inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, manure) 91
b. use of compost 96
c. use of a strict scheme  66
d. more maintenance (weeding, watering)  72  
 












st year of 
operation
last season
Soleil Vert 2000 800 1100 100 20
Sepam 1992 883 1410 100 60
Master  1989 68 0 50 40
Baniang 1999 80 150 85 85
Agriconcept 2002 100 80 30 30
ANS Interexport 2001 64 0 100 100
Pasen 2000 30 0 100 60
Agral Export 1992 180 0 100 100
PDG 1993 173 239 100 100
Export volume in 
2004 (ton) 









Source: Maertens and Swinnen, 2006   32 
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horticulture products French beans
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Figure 4:  Household income (in 1,000 FCFA) from different sources for 
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